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How Do Crises LeaD  
to CHange?
Liberalizing Capital Controls in the 
early Years of new order indonesia
By JeffreY M. CHwierotH*
eConoMiC crises often bring about remarkable transformations. Periods of hard times such as the great Depression, the oil and in-
flationary crises of the 1970s, the debt crises of the 1980s, the emerging 
market crises of the 1990s, and the global financial crisis of 2007–09, 
are commonly believed to be associated with dramatic change. these 
periods of dramatic change reveal the importance of economic struc-
tures, distributive preferences, strategic agency, uncertainty, and belief 
systems. not surprisingly, the significance of these periods has led a 
number of scholars to ask: How do crises lead to change?
one prominent rationalist view is that crises induce change as some 
inexorable structural response.1 rationalists working with open economy 
models of politics (oep) depict crises as exogenous shocks that reshape 
the distribution of domestic political power and permit the newly domi-
nant coalition to pursue reforms that reflect its distributive preferences.2 
Constructivists argue that crisis politics is about the endogenous con-
struction of new intersubjective beliefs that necessitate change.3
there are important limitations to each perspective. first, crises, no 
matter how visible or severe, do not induce an automatic response. Cri-
ses alter the domestic balance of power and ideas in varying ways that 
bring bargaining, negotiation, and persuasion to the forefront of the 
crisis resolution process. oep models, while sensible, can often be too 
sparse and too far removed from specific national circumstances to be 
* i am grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts provided by Vedi Hadiz, John sidel, and 
andrew walter.
1 stallings 1992.
2 gourevitch 1986; Haggard and Maxfield 1996.
3 Blyth 2002; widmaier et al. 2007.
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4 Culpepper 2008.
a useful guide for understanding crisis politics. oep models also remain 
wanting to the extent that crisis resolution cannot be understood simply 
in terms of the domestic power balance and the process of bargaining 
and negotiation. Because crises induce uncertainty that constrains ac-
tors from fully grasping their distributive preferences, how actors inter-
pret and debate the meaning of material events and incentives as giving 
rise to particular courses of action must also be considered. while not 
denying the influence of distributive preferences at particular stages of 
the crisis resolution process, i argue that until uncertainty is reduced, 
the influence of persuasion relative to bargaining and negotiation is 
heightened as a mechanism of change, as constructivists contend.
although intersubjective belief change shapes the crisis resolution 
process, constructivists have thus far not adequately specified the scope 
conditions under which a new idea is likely to win out over others. in 
cases where constructivists do consider this issue, they typically point 
to the need for a new idea to resonate with the preexisting beliefs of 
domestic elites and the mass public. in other words, they argue that a 
new idea must be perceived as legitimate within the context of existing 
belief systems.
while capturing the role of belief systems, this work suffers from 
two shortcomings. first, it obscures the influence of external actors and 
thus fails to consider the often decisive impact the perceived need to 
establish credibility with these actors has on the crisis resolution pro-
cess. second, it tends to be overly static and structural, focusing on the 
possibility of congruence to the neglect of possibilities for congruence-
building. this article seeks to rectify these shortcomings.
Crises lead to change through a three-stage process: crisis, experi-
mentation, and consolidation.4 in the crisis stage, norm entrepreneurs 
employ their ideas to implicate the status quo as flawed, usually due to 
a severe economic downturn or dramatic failure, and as necessitating 
change. this construction of a crisis generates uncertainty as to what 
has gone wrong and how it can be remedied.
as actors struggle with uncertainty in the experimentation stage, 
persuasion and argumentation take center stage as rival norm entre-
preneurs and defenders of the status quo offer competing diagnoses. 
only after actors have reduced uncertainty by settling on a common 
diagnosis and blueprints for action have been developed, do distribu-
tive preferences assert themselves. the consolidation stage begins only 
after a new set of policies and institutions has been created.
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Crisis resolution thus happens largely in the crisis and experimenta-
tion stages; this is where i focus my attention. the ideas most likely to 
form the basis of new beliefs depend on four features: the carriers of the 
ideas, the composition of the group advocating the ideas, the crossover 
appeal of the ideas, and their credibility with external actors—what i 
call the “four Cs” of crisis resolution. Briefly stated, whenever a promi-
nent and cohesive group of advocates promotes a new idea that has 
sufficient distributive and ideational appeal and the endorsement of 
external actors whose seal of approval is perceived as important, inter-
subjective belief change is more likely.
i develop these arguments in the section below and then examine 
them empirically in the case of the early years of new order indonesia. 
i employ this case to illustrate the mechanisms through which crises 
induce change. a severe economic downturn in indonesia in the mid-
1960s led to reforms that culminated in capital account liberalization 
in 1970. at the time, the decision to liberalize the capital account was 
remarkable since, with the exception of Mexico, there were hardly any 
developing countries, or even developed countries, that had taken such 
a dramatic step.
these reforms have been well documented in studies conducted by 
indonesianists, many of which i rely upon in this analysis.5 while there 
are potential shortcomings to relying extensively on secondary sources, 
much of my analysis also employs interviews with and primary docu-
ments from individuals who were prominent policymakers at the time. 
surprisingly few of the accounts offered by indonesianists make use 
of these sources, perhaps because many of the sources were not made 
available until the late 1990s—after much of the indonesianist work 
on the early years of the new order had already been published. More 
importantly, the central goal of this article is not to offer a novel com-
prehensive account of the new order, but rather to use the empirical 
evidence from the case to offer a broader argument about crisis poli-
tics—one that considers a fuller array of factors together, rather than 
separately, and that demonstrates how these factors in conjunction lead 
to particular outcomes.
there has been much recent work on the strengths and weaknesses 
of case-study analysis relative to statistical and comparative analysis.6 a 
key goal of my analysis is to investigate the causal mechanisms through 
which crises produce change, a goal for which case-study analysis is 
5 see, for instance, Bresnan 1993; Cole and slade 1996; Liddle 1991; Macintyre 1993; Pincus and 
ramli 1998; robison 1986; winters 1996.
6 gerring 2007; george and Bennett 2005.
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well-suited but statistical and comparative analysis are not. Case-study 
analysis permits intensive investigation of a particular outcome, though 
it comes at the expense of extensive generalizability. However, because 
the focus of my inquiry is in understanding why and how crises gener-
ate change in the way that they do rather than in understanding the 
magnitude and relative precision of the causal relationship between 
crises and change, i chose not to engage in cross-national comparison. 
still, the analysis highlights some spatial and temporal variation within 
the case as well as several comparative applications of the argument, 
and the conclusion considers its potential scope.
crisis resolution: carriers, composition, crossover appeal, 
and credibility
in normal times, intersubjective beliefs, or common knowledge, con-
verge on a shared account of the workings of the economy and the 
way they should interrelate. these beliefs permit actors to diagnose 
dysfunctions and identify remedies for them. normal politics may 
consist of bargaining, negotiation, and debates over changes to the in-
struments and settings of policy, but the intersubjective beliefs remain 
unchanged.7 However, even normal politics is characterized by norm 
entrepreneurs operating as voices in the wilderness and waiting for 
opportunities to promote their preferred alternative to the status quo 
through a process of “strategic social construction.”8
 in the crisis stage, the declining performance of status quo insti-
tutions and policies destabilizes the intersubjective beliefs underlying 
them. But material events, however, cannot be reduced solely to au-
tomatic incentives for change. actors’ intersubjective beliefs must first 
interpret and construct events as a crisis for the status quo that neces-
sitates change.9
 norm entrepreneurs play an influential role during the crisis phase 
through naming and framing practices. they use ideas instrumentally 
as weapons to contest the status quo and delegitimize the beliefs sup-
porting it. when norm entrepreneurs successfully construct a crisis, 
the result is uncertainty.10 when the old rules of the game can no lon-
ger be taken for granted, actors seek guidance as to how to understand 
and behave in an unfamiliar situation.
7 Hall 1993.
8 finnemore and sikkink 1998, 888.
9 widmaier, Blyth, and seabrooke. 2007.
10 Blyth 2002.
500 world politics 
the experimentation stage begins with uncertainty as a binding 
constraint that leads actors to be more receptive to persuasion. with 
precrisis beliefs destabilized, actors seek a new way first to interpret 
their situation and then to remedy it. Crisis politics becomes focused 
on creating new intersubjective beliefs. Here the same ideas employed 
as weapons to implicate the precrisis status quo as responsible for the 
crisis can reduce uncertainty by narrowing possible causes of the crisis 
to a significant degree.
in some accounts the experimentation stage is depicted as one where 
the newly dominant coalition has stable distributive preferences that 
it implements through changes to the precrisis status quo.11 Yet these 
accounts also reveal this process as characterized by uncertainty. Pep-
per Culpepper offers one potential solution, positing that even as ac-
tors struggle with uncertainty they have “some idea of the distributive 
consequences of any given institutional choice.”12 But this view is not 
entirely convincing. while distributive preferences do influence particu-
lar stages of the process, such preferences can come into play only after 
uncertainty has been reduced and alternative remedies have been identi-
fied.
Uncertainty reduction is temporally prior to any negotiation or bar-
gaining over remedies since actors must first have some idea what the 
crisis is and what caused it. absent such ideas, actors cannot rank alter-
native remedies. there is, as Culpepper observes, “a real game of figur-
ing out what is going on in the world.”13 even following uncertainty 
reduction, it is not clear that distributive preferences will be decisive, 
since without any a priori experience with the new institutions and pol-
icies, actor interests in such institutions and policies will be necessarily 
underdetermined.14 Persuasion, rather than bargaining and negotiation, 
thus becomes increasingly important as a mechanism for change.
after uncertainty is reduced, actors rely on ideas to serve as a blue-
print for action and as a coalition-building resource.15 By providing a 
common goal for action, these ideas also provide the basis for the for-
mation of a coalition among entrepreneurs pursuing change. the third 
and final stage, consolidation, emerges only after a new set of policies 
and institutions has been created. to understand how actors resolve 
crises i therefore focus on the set of scope conditions that facilitates 
intersubjective change in the crisis and experimentation stages.
11 gourevitch 1986; Haggard and Maxfield 1996.
12 Culpepper 2008, 6–7.
13 Culpepper 2008, 6.
14 Blyth 2007.
15 Blyth 2002.
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winning ideas will have the features related to the four Cs of crisis 
resolution. first, the quality of the carrier advocating the idea matters. 
the appeal of a new idea is enhanced when it is carried by an entrepre-
neur perceived as prominent or authoritative.16 Hence, expertise derived 
from experience, knowledge, training, and credentials can prove to be 
an important asset. Uncertain as to what has gone wrong, actors turn 
to experts, which permits norm entrepreneurs with expert authority to 
draw on this asset to mobilize crisis arguments that implicate the status 
quo as necessitating change. Because success breeds success, the clout 
and authority of experts can increase (or potentially decrease) when 
their prescriptions are perceived to have generated success (or failure).
second, the composition of the advocacy group matters. in promoting 
their beliefs, norm entrepreneurs typically confront resistance from de-
fenders of the status quo as well as from advocates of alternative beliefs. 
in confronting this resistance, a cohesive group characterized by like-
minded members is in a stronger position than a heterogeneous group 
to persuade, negotiate, and bargain with other actors.17 Cohesion can 
enhance the persuasive power of an advocacy group by ensuring con-
sistent advice from its members. Cohesion can also shape negotiations 
and bargaining over distributional consequences by helping to insulate 
the decision-making process from opposing beliefs and demands.
third, crossover appeal matters. following uncertainty reduction, 
ideas can serve as important coalition-building resources. the likeli-
hood that an actor will find an idea appealing is partly shaped by its res-
onance with that actor’s distributive and ideational preferences. Much 
of the work on resonance has focused on the extent to which an idea 
fits with the preferences of domestic elites and the mass public.18 while 
insightful, this work suffers from two shortcomings.
the first of these is that it obscures the influence of external actors. as 
such, it fails to give adequate attention to the fourth feature of winning 
ideas—that credibility matters. resonance cannot be defined simply in 
terms of domestic elites and the mass public; how remedies fit with the 
preferences of official and private-market actors must also be considered. 
the perceived need to establish credibility with external actors can thus 
trump the perceived need to establish legitimacy with domestic actors.
when a government sends a signal, it seeks to communicate to ex-
ternal actors that it shares and is committed to their policy beliefs. But 
by dealing with these beliefs by assumption and focusing on the incen-
16 finnemore and sikkink 1998.
17 Chwieroth 2007.
18 Culpepper 2008; Hall 1989; seabrooke 2007a.
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tives for action, rationalists often miss out on how these beliefs affect 
the type of incentives that are generated. sociological institutionalists 
understand signalling as a form of “ceremonial conformity.”19 But while 
the perceived need for external legitimacy or resources may be what 
creates incentives for conformity, the beliefs that external actors share 
determine what ceremony must be performed. these beliefs privilege 
certain actions over others, ultimately leading the behavior preferred 
by external actors to be perceived as the sole credible action, even if in 
theory other actions are equally sustainable.20
 official and market sentiments thus create severe policy constraints, 
particularly when the perceived need for their approval is high. Policies 
that go against these sentiments will not be judged as credible and will 
jeopardize access to external legitimacy and resources. norm entrepre-
neurs recognize that the beliefs of external actors can be useful assets and 
thus often deliberately ally themselves with these actors to push for re-
forms. when the perceived need for credibility is high, such as during an 
economic crisis, domestic norm entrepreneurs whose prescriptions reso-
nate with the beliefs of relevant external actors will be empowered. in 
debates with their opponents, these domestic norm entrepreneurs can 
employ this resonance to present themselves and their policy blueprint 
as the only way to establish credibility and resolve the crisis.
 a second shortcoming of the work on resonance is that it much of 
is overly static and structural and it describes, as amitav acharya ob-
serves, “an existential match…rather than a dynamic process of match-
matching.”21 this static view obscures the processes of naming, framing, 
and grafting that are at the very heart of strategic social construction. 
the static focus on congruence thus misses the dynamic processes of 
congruence-building that reveal the role of strategic agency and how 
norm entrepreneurs can overcome barriers to change. instead of treat-
ing norm resonance as simply a static match, i stress a more dynamic 
process with emphasis on the strategic agency of norm entrepreneurs.
indonesia: the guided economy, economic deterioration,  
and crisis resolution
in the 1960s most indonesians subscribed to nationalist, statist, and 
collectivist beliefs, creating a significant obstacle to market reforms.22 
Capitalism and openness to foreign capital, in particular, were equated 
19 Meyer and rowan 1977.
20 Kirshner 2003.
21 acharya 2004, 243.
22 feith and Castles 1970; Liddle 1988.
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with colonialism and exploitation, while support for collectivist forms 
of social organization reinforced this deep suspicion of free markets. 
ethnic politics also created obstacles to market reforms. Chinese in-
donesians are a minority of the population, and while most are not 
wealthy, some did become enormously rich and as a group owned the 
largest share of private domestic capital. this generated widespread re-
sentment among indigenous indonesians (pribumi) and was a key rea-
son behind the state intervention in the economy that provided them 
with preferential access to state resources.
 tensions between the two ethnic groups often spilled over into vio-
lence. as a result, some well-placed Chinese businessmen relied on their 
connections to develop large conglomerates under military protection. 
in exchange for physical protection, these businessmen enriched their 
military patrons as well as added to their own wealth—often through 
the formation of joint ventures.
 in the late 1950s, President sukarno launched an intensive drive for 
state-led industrialization under the rubric of what he called the guided 
economy. economic considerations were effectively subordinated to the 
government’s political priorities. Many foreign firms were nationalized, 
had their licenses revoked, or ceased operations. in sectors where foreign 
direct investment (fdi) could not be avoided, such as the oil sector, the 
government required joint ventures and production-sharing agreements.
 for industrial policy and patronage purposes, the government inter-
vened extensively in the financial system.23 the central bank’s limited 
autonomy was revoked as the government relied on it to finance un-
precedented fiscal deficits. the government also took control over the 
allocation of credit by largely centralizing disbursement in state banks. 
Capital flows were tightly restricted.
 sukarnoist policies resulted in rapid expansion of the money sup-
ply and hyperinflation. following an abortive orthodox stabilization 
program in 1963, monetary growth continued largely unabated. reck-
less fiscal and monetary policies, hyperinflation, and an overvalued ex-
change rate produced recurring balance-of-payments crises. By mid-
1965 the government faced forecasts showing an insufficient amount 
of reserves to cover debt-service costs and import requirements. 24
constructing a crisis and the new order
the sukarno regime collapsed in late 1965. in the ensuing months, the 
army, led by suharto, increasingly seized control. the need for change 
23 Macintyre 1993.
24 Palmer 1978, 7; woo, glassburner, and nasution 1994, 29.
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was apparent, but the direction of change was not determined by an 
inexorable structural response.
 of particular importance was norm entrepreneurship from a group 
of western-trained University of indonesia (ui) economists: widjojo 
nitisastro, ali wardhana, Mohammad sadli, emil salim, subroto, 
Johannes B. sumarlin, and radius Prawiro.25 for some time members 
of this group had operated as voices in the wilderness, waiting for an 
opportunity to promote an alternative to sukarnoism. the deteriorat-
ing situation in late 1965 offered the opportunity and they seized it.
 the ui economists, due to their common professional training, 
shared a common diagnosis of the causes of indonesia’s deteriora-
tion and a belief that market reforms would remedy it. their com-
mon training, along with personal relationships of trust and friendship, 
helped to forge the group into a cohesive team. as Prawiro reported, 
“the esprit de corps among the economic team was exceptional. this 
was possible because we were all economists with similar training and 
shared a common set of beliefs regarding principles of sound economic 
management. [we] all spoke the same economic language. all of the 
team members shared very similar assumptions on the economy and 
used the same abbreviated economic jargon.”26 widjojo served as the 
unofficial but acknowledged leader, helping to forge the economists 
into a cohesive group.27
the ui economists believed in neoclassical economics and the capac-
ity of markets to stir growth and efficiency. wielding these beliefs as 
weapons, they implicated sukarnoist policies as producing a dramatic 
failure in the form of hyperinflation. in their diagnosis, surkarno’s el-
evation of political priorities over economic considerations had resulted 
in persistent and growing fiscal deficits and unchecked credit expan-
sion. Bureaucratic expansion, which further strained the budget and 
invited corruption by giving bureaucrats discretionary control over the 
distribution of state resources, was also identified as contributing to 
hyperinflation. a new policy-making process was required, widjojo ar-
gued, one that gave due consideration to prices and material incentives 
and that was insulated from political interference.28
25 it is not my intention to equate this group of economists with membership in the “Berkeley Ma-
fia,” though there is a significant degree of overlap. the crucial difference is the inclusion of Prawiro, 
who did not receive training at Berkeley but did receive some economics training in the west (the 
netherlands) and was critical in advocating similar ideas as those trained at Berkeley. it is for this 
reason that i opt for the label “ui economists” as opposed to “Berkeley Mafia.”
26 Prawiro 1998, 83. see also salim 1997, 65.
27 Prawiro 1998, 83; salim 1997, 54, 65; sadli 1993, 41.
28 Bresnan 1993, 53–54.
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the ui economists’ blueprint presented orthodox stabilization, open-
ness to foreign capital, and financial assistance from official creditors 
as the only way out of the crisis.29 Liberalizing capital controls, they 
argued, would stir growth and competition. as sadli insisted, “indige-
nous firms will flourish in such a climate. the existence of foreign firms 
will have a catalytic effect upon further growth of the national econ-
omy. the charge frequently heard in ex-colonial economies that foreign 
business stifles the growth of indigenous business will be avoided.”30
Capital account liberalization stands out among the reforms in the 
ui economists’ plan. it did not resonate with the beliefs and interests 
of the pribumi elite and mass public who saw inward fdi as harming 
domestic firms and distorting development and the removal of restric-
tions on outflows as undermining capital accumulation. the opposition 
of these actors to liberalization is at odds with expectations derived 
from oep models.31 oep models would expect these actors to support 
greater openness because inward fdi would presumably raise the real 
earnings of local landowners and labor, while the increase in the sup-
ply of finance would presumably lower borrowing costs for owners of 
specific capital in a capital-scarce country.
there are several reasons why this was not the case. to begin with, 
oep models overstate the likely support for openness from the tradables 
and nontradables sectors in developing economies. in many develop-
ing economies, capital controls impose higher borrowing costs only 
on firms in the nontradables sector because they lack access to foreign 
currency revenues to service their debt.32 However, firms in the trad-
ables sector are typically less affected. even if greater openness lowers 
borrowing costs by stirring domestic financial development, the shift 
would be virtually irrelevant in the tradables sector, especially in econo-
mies open to trade, since this sector relies less on domestic financing.33 
thus, contrary to common assumptions in oep models, the tradables 
sector in developing economies may have weak incentives to favor lib-
eralization or will be indifferent to it.
in some cases, the nontradables sector in developing countries will 
also be indifferent to liberalization or may have weak incentives to sup-
port it. in developing economies, most small- and medium-sized do-
mestic firms in the nontradables sector—such as those owned by many 
29 Bresnan 1993, 54, 58, 60. see also Prawiro 1998: 4–7, 22, 32.
30 as cited in robison 1986, 133, 136.
31 frieden 1991.
32 Prati, schindler, and Valenzuela 2009.
33 Braun and raddatz 2007.
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of indonesia’s pribumi—do not benefit greatly from any increase in the 
supply of finance that comes from openness. Historically, private sources 
of finance, especially foreign ones, were reluctant to lend to these firms, 
and the firms therefore found themselves dependent on state banks. 
openness thus offered these firms little potential benefit—at least in 
the short to medium term—because few, if any, foreign private credi-
tors would likely lend to them.34 in addition to material incentives, in a 
number of developing economies, as in indonesia, nationalist and stat-
ist beliefs fuelled popular opposition to openness despite any income 
effects that it potentially induced.
oep models also understate likely support for liberalization in many 
developing economies. a number of these models assume that open-
ness harms liquid-asset holders in capital-scarce countries because 
of the lower returns they face on their investments. this assumption 
misses out on the substantial risks and vulnerabilities that characterize 
investment in these developing economies. in the specific case of indo-
nesia, Chinese businesses saw openness as a hedge against their politi-
cal vulnerability. openness enabled them to send their assets abroad 
at the first sign of political instability, overriding concerns about the 
depressed rate of return.35
taken together, these considerations created a configuration of inter-
ests within indonesia that bare little resemblance to oep expectations. 
indeed, as Jeffry frieden concedes: “it is worth emphasizing again that 
these conclusions [derived from oep] abstract from many specifics that 
may indeed override them…. Clearly, other characteristics [can] out-
weigh the tendencies discussed here.”36
 the process of destabilizing the sukarnoist status quo was not 
automatic. sukarno had been forced to yield much authority to the 
army, but he retained the nominal title of president—a position he 
would hold until March 1967. He could still count on significant sup-
port from leftists within the army and segments of the mass public to 
whom he appealed through revolutionary and anti-western rhetoric 
and a confrontational approach with official creditors. october 1965 to 
March 1967 was thus a transition period, with great uncertainty over 
who would prevail politically.
34 as noted, some large conglomerates owned by pribumi had developed close connections with 
well-placed Chinese businessmen, which the conglomerates relied upon for credit in exchange for pro-
viding physical protection. to the extent that liberalization lowered borrowing costs for these Chinese 
businessmen, it would indirectly benefit large and politically influential pribumi conglomerates.
35 winters 1996. in addition, in many developing economies financial repression lowered the re-
turns to liquid-asset holders, which provided these actors another incentive to favor openness.
36 frieden 1991, 440–44, fn . 29.
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in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a number of the ui economists 
had served as lecturers at the army training school in Bandung where 
they forged ties with some senior army officials, including suharto.37 
this experience gave the ui economists the opportunity to cultivate 
among the army officials an appreciation for how important economic 
considerations were for indonesia’s future as well as to introduce those 
officials to their beliefs about the causes of indonesia’s deterioration. 
when the sukarno regime collapsed, the ui economists were thus al-
ready well known and respected by the army as authoritative sources of 
information on economic matters. Determined to persuade army of-
ficials to support their arguments, the ui economists convened several 
public seminars on the state of the economy.
the first, known as the new Path seminar because it was the first 
time that policies of the guided economy were criticized openly, was 
convened in January 1966. several of the ui economists spoke at it. 
sadli offered the most notable critique of sukarnoism, attacking the 
problems of inflation, imbalances in price relationships, the size of the 
bureaucracy, declining exports, and the prioritization of political goals 
to the detriment of economic considerations. He argued strongly for 
liberalizing capital controls. “we must recognize,” he said, “that we lack 
the capital to improve the economy and develop the nation. we need 
capital, yet we cannot raise capital internally. we must look for capital 
from abroad.”38
the new order under suharto was formed in March 1966. a tri-
umvirate of deputy premiers was created with suharto in charge of 
defense and security; adam Malik, a prominent nationalist, in charge 
of foreign affairs; and sultan Hamengkubuwono iX, a respected Java-
nese aristocrat, in charge of economic affairs. with army training and 
a limited education, suharto was unschooled in and unsure about eco-
nomic matters, but he and other actors had to deal with the uncertainty 
that resulted from destabilization of the precrisis status quo. as actors 
sought new ways to interpret the environment and to remedy the situ-
ation, the ui economists relied on and articulated a set of arguments 
based on neoclassical models and assumptions. as Prawiro reports, “at 
the time…nothing was clear. the policies were complex and the crisis 
was deep. working in an atmosphere of frenzy, the team took a leap of 
faith that the free market and the power of prudent macroeconomic 
policy would prevail. in the end, because of the cohesiveness of team 
37 sadli 1993, 39; salim 1997, 56.
38 as cited in ford foundation 2003, 59. see also sadli 1993, 40.
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and the essential correctness of their economic positions, the gamble 
paid off.”39
at the time, however, a number of alternatives presented themselves 
for selection. Certainly, indonesia’s economic deterioration had revealed 
a need for change, but it is implausible to claim that this alone forced 
suharto to move in the direction he did. alternative models were avail-
able from regional neighbors, such as Burma and south Korea, where 
army governments had also recently seized power.
in Burma, the socialist-leaning army government moved toward 
greater closure and implemented soviet-style nationalization and cen-
tral planning. this alternative did not appeal to suharto primarily be-
cause of his right-wing and pro-american orientation. according to 
sarbini sumawinata, a member of the University of indonesia econom-
ics faculty (but not part of the foreign-trained group advocating market 
reforms) and a key political advisor to suharto, “the army knew what it 
did not want, for example, communism, but was less sure about where 
to go from there.”40 they were, as one source notes, “in great need of 
new and large ideas.”41
south Korea offered an alternative that aligned more closely with 
suharto’s ideological and geopolitical orientation. indeed, a material-
ist explanation would expect governments with similar ideological and 
geopolitical orientations and a similar degree of dependence on the 
west to pursue similar development strategies. But while these mate-
rial incentives seemingly led south Korea and indonesia down a similar 
path, the ideas embraced by the army in each country pushed them 
in different directions. on one hand, the army regime in south Ko-
rea chose a set of interventionist policies inspired by Japan and that 
marginalized the influence of western-trained economists.42 suharto, 
on the other hand, moved in the direction of neoliberalism, and the 
ui economists secured greater influence (though in the end indonesia 
combined neoliberalism and interventionism). that indonesia settled 
upon the policy course it did was primarily due to the selection of the 
ui economists’ ideas over alternatives, a process that was in turn shaped 
by the four Cs of crisis resolution.
as actors struggled with uncertainty, the ui economists, as part of 
their advocacy, helped craft the new order’s first major statement on 
the economy, which the sultan delivered in april 1966.43 the state-
39 Prawiro 1998, 84. see also 26–28.
40 sumawinata 1992, 50.
41 Bresnan 1993, 52.
42 Haggard 1990.
43 Hamengkubuwono iX 1997 [1966].
 how do crises lead to change? 509
ment indicated that indonesia would rejoin the international Mon-
etary fund (imf) and the world Bank, which sukarno had withdrawn 
from in 1965, and would approach official creditors to discuss debt re-
scheduling and new financing. in a further departure from sukarnoism, 
the statement also revealed that the private sector’s role in the economy 
would be expanded and foreign capital welcomed.
However, these general public commitments masked the fact that 
privately the army had yet to make any decisions on specific measures. 
the ui economists therefore continued to press their views. another 
seminar was convened in May 1966. there subroto unleashed a no-
table attack on the guided economy and the ui economists elaborated 
their blueprint for action: a new track based on orthodox stabilization, 
openness to foreign capital, and assistance from official creditors.44
By early summer 1966, the direction of change was becoming clearer. 
although much of sukarno’s de facto power had been transferred to su-
harto by virtue of an earlier decree (the supersemar), suharto needed to 
maintain the appearance of legality so as not to alienate sukarno’s sup-
porters before consolidating power. the general session of parliament, 
which began in late June, furthered suharto’s consolidation of power 
by ratifying the supersemar and commissioning him to form a new 
cabinet. the parliament also supported the ui economists’ blueprint, 
approving a statement the group had drafted—left virtually unchanged 
by suharto—that committed to orthodox stabilization, expansion of 
the private sector, and greater openness to foreign capital.
a new cabinet was appointed in July and represented a compromise 
among various competing forces. for some observers, the new cabinet 
had “unmistakenly abandoned the leftist mystique of sukarno’s guided 
Democracy.”45 Yet for others, most prominently U.s. intelligence op-
eratives, the cabinet choices had “compromised [the] chances for an 
effective approach to economic problems” in order to appease sukarno 
and his supporters, and indicated that the generals had “no basic inter-
est in economic affairs.”46
while the new order offered the first sign of its intentions with 
the sultan’s april statement, many observers at the time were skeptical 
and dismissed the generals as indifferent to and ignorant of economic 
realities.47 when the cabinet was appointed in July, suharto still had 
not fully bought into the blueprint of the ui economists, which, due to 
its emphasis on stabilization and liberalization, would adversely affect 
44 Bresnan 1993, 54; Prawiro 1998, 4–7, 22, 32; subroto1998, 74.
45 anderson et al. 1966, 186.
46 simpson 2008, 218.
47 elson 2001, 139; simpson 2008, 220.
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the army—an organization riddled with corruption and entrenched in 
state enterprises. as one source notes, the generals “would need tutor-
ing from the technocrats.”48
the crucial turning point occurred in august during a seminar held 
at the army training school in Bandung. it was the first time that most 
of the ui economists met suharto and by all accounts it was when they 
won him over to their plan. “that particular seminar,” notes one new 
order cabinet official, “was the main source, if not the only source, of 
inspiration for the new order….the new order originated in Band-
ung.”49 indeed, suharto later remarked that the seminar had “formu-
lated the new order.”50
at the seminar widjojo, sadli, and salim met with the generals to 
argue in person for their ideas. sarbini was set to argue for an alter-
native plan and at the start of the seminar, stood an equal chance of 
winning over suharto. the great impression he had made on of one of 
suharto’s advisers had resulted in an invitation to serve as vice chair of 
one of the seminar sessions. in addition, his plan was broadly congruent 
with the beliefs of important members of suharto’s cabinet, including 
Malik and the sultan, as well as with popular sentiment.51 the principal 
debate took place between widjojo and sarbini. although their diag-
noses were quite similar, their blueprints were rather different. sarbini’s 
plan, while recognizing the short-run importance of reducing inflation 
and seeking foreign assistance, was generally inward oriented. He ar-
gued that over the long run indonesia’s development should come to 
rely more upon domestic than foreign capital. to accomplish this goal, 
the plan called for a massive program of compulsory domestic saving 
and renewed government assistance to pribumi firms.52
Despite sarbini’s close links to suharto and the appeal of his blue-
print to key cabinet members and popular sentiment, widjojo won the 
argument. He criticized sarbini’s plan for its failure to explain how 
compulsory domestic saving could produce sufficient investment in a 
country suffering from a shortage of capital and reiterated his blueprint 
of orthodox stabilization, liberalization, and assistance from official 
creditors.
 the success of the ui economists in arguing for their plan under-
mines the alternative materialist explanation that emphasizes the pri-
macy of the logic of consequentialism and distributive preferences. 
48 simpson 2008, 220.
49 elson 2001, 148.
50 as cited in elson 2001, 148.
51 winters 1996, 64.
52 Liddle 1991, 412.
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Many pribumi firms and members of the mass public opposed the ui 
economists’ blueprint because, in their view, it would deepen the reces-
sion and foster greater foreign dependence. these actors held out hope 
that expansionary policies could be used to increase productivity.53 But 
widjojo, in laying out the blueprint, did not bow to these distributive 
preferences and neither did suharto when he selected it.
 at the seminar, suharto engaged in a dialogue with the ui econo-
mists about their diagnosis and plan. according to sadli, the seminar 
presented “the army leadership with a ‘cookbook’ of ‘recipes’ for deal-
ing with indonesia’s serious economic problems. general suharto as 
the top army commander not only accepted the cookbook, but also 
wanted the authors of the ‘recipes’ as his economic advisors.”54
soon after the seminar the ui economists were appointed as su-
harto’s team of experts in the field of economics and finance. the close 
relationship between suharto and the ui economists would persist until 
the disintegration of the new order in 1998. During this period the 
ui economists took on a number of cabinet posts, beginning with the 
appointment of Prawiro as central bank governor in 1966, followed 
by the appointments of widjojo and salim as chair and deputy chair 
of the national Development Planning agency (Bappenas) in 1967, 
and, in 1968, the appointment of ali wardhana as finance minister. 
over the years, this cohesive team was joined by other foreign-trained 
indonesian economists, many of whom also received their training at 
Berkeley.
why were the arguments of the ui economists selected? Contradict-
ing much of the work on norm resonance, the ui economists’ arguments 
did not fit well with the beliefs or interests of the vast majority of the 
domestic actors, particularly pribumi firms and the mass public. How-
ever, consistent with the theory developed here, a crucial feature of the 
ui economists’ arguments was that they resonated with the beliefs and 
interests of key external actors with whom the new regime perceived a 
need to establish credibility. Ultimately, these arguments won out over 
various alternatives because of the quality and composition of their car-
riers, the coalitions they enabled, and the way the arguments fit with 
the new regime’s perceived need for credibility with external actors.
the quality of the ui economists as unrivalled sources of economic 
expertise was undoubtedly important. Like many military regimes, 
much of suharto’s legitimacy depended on delivering development. 
this legitimating principle, particularly during times of economic de-
53 Bresnan 1993, 71.
54 sadli 1993, 40–41.
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terioration, elevated the importance of the ui economists because it 
meant that suharto, who was uncertain about economic matters, would 
be predisposed to rely upon them as having the strongest claim to eco-
nomic expertise. the ui economists’ expertise enabled them to wield 
analytical tools that could explain indonesia’s inflation, shortage of cap-
ital, low productivity, and recurring balance of payments crises. their 
arguments were persuasive in part because, as Peter Hall suggests, they 
could “relate to the economic and political problems of the day.”55
the composition of the group of ui economists and their cohesion, 
in particular, was also important. according to one source, suharto 
“was deeply impressed with the clarity of their ideas, the unanimity 
with which they were presented, and their pragmatic sense.”56 the ui 
economists also discursively framed their arguments, despite their dis-
tributional implications, as based on objective expertise, not political 
considerations. they pursued what one source calls a “straight econom-
ics” approach, offering their prescriptions as transcending politics and 
formed on the basis of objective and universal criteria while casting the 
arguments of their opponents as sectional in nature.57
the decision to seek out assistance from external actors meant that 
establishing credibility with those actors became of utmost importance, 
as it would whenever suharto perceived a need for their support. But 
this decision was not automatic. Popular nationalist sentiment meant 
that many indonesians saw external assistance as deepening depen-
dence. indeed, sukarno’s confrontational approach to external actors, 
epitomized by his nationalist rhetoric telling the west to “go to hell 
with your aid” and castigating the new order for its “begging,” was 
aimed at cultivating this sentiment.58
Yet suharto was convinced of the need to gain external assistance. 
their command of much needed resources gave these external actors 
and their domestic allies, in this case the ui economists, enormous 
leverage and, more significantly, it meant that these external actors’ 
beliefs would highly influence the direction of change. During the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, U.s. officials set out to forge 
close ties with the ui economists, helping them, for instance, to secure 
private foundation study grants in the U.s. and faculty exchanges with 
american universities. as sukarno’s grip on power gradually slipped 
away, washington made it clear that assistance would be conditional 
on stabilization and liberalization. the resonance of the ui economists’ 
55 Hall 1989, 369–70.
56 elson 2001, 149.
57 azis 1994, 399.
58 as cited in Hill 2000, 79: “go to hell with your aid”; and winters 1996, 58: “begging.”.
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arguments with the beliefs of external actors provided the economists 
with an important asset to employ in their struggles with their domes-
tic opponents. in fact, the U.s. embassy in Jakarta consistently sent 
clear signals to army leaders “that indonesia would not get aid until 
they went the way the economists advised.”59
in addition, the imf and the world Bank played an active part in 
strengthening the impetus for market reforms. they deliberately sup-
ported the ui economists, who shared their policy beliefs but were not 
yet in government, and bypassed those actors within the government 
who opposed their policy beliefs. in July 1966, with official creditors 
still withholding support, the imf took the rather unusual step of send-
ing a staff mission to Jakarta even though indonesia would not formally 
rejoin the fund until february 1967. for its part, the world Bank sent 
a mission in august 1966 and later took the unprecedented step of 
creating a permanent mission in 1968. informal discussions between 
the ui economists, the imf, and the world Bank ensured that the ui 
economists could come forward with a blueprint that would command 
external support. suharto recognized that to access financial resources, 
indonesia needed to commit to policies that resonated with the beliefs 
of external actors regardless of how they fit with domestic beliefs and 
interests. although official creditors extended some token emergency 
aid following the Bandung seminar, they made it clear that new fi-
nancing and debt rescheduling would not be forthcoming until their 
preferred policies were implemented.
a final crucial factor underpinning the selection of the ui economists’ 
arguments was the way they could be used to appeal to the broad coali-
tion of actors upon whom suharto depended for political survival. su-
harto faced a dilemma. on one hand, stabilization and liberalization, if 
successful, would foster macroeconomic stability and stir development 
and thus establish credibility with external actors and enhance the re-
gime’s legitimacy with the mass public. on the other hand, these same 
reforms would adversely affect the army, pribumi firms, and the mass 
public as well as constrain the use of patron-client networks to main-
tain political support. also weighing in on this dilemma were suharto’s 
own beliefs, which aligned closely with nationalists in the army and 
government who were united by their rejection of free markets, support 
for infant industry arguments, and opposition to foreign capital.
 although on the surface there appeared to be no easy way to recon-
cile this dilemma, in fact, part of the appeal of the ui economists’ blue-
print was that there was sufficient scope for suharto to prune it—that 
59 simpson 2008, 219.
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is, adjust it so that it better fit with his beliefs and interests and those 
of his political supporters.60 suharto realized early on that he could 
reconcile his dilemma by balancing the arguments of the ui economists 
and the nationalists.61 By confining the influence of the ui economists 
to agencies in charge of macroeconomic issues (the finance ministry, 
the central bank, and Bappenas), and the influence of the national-
ists to agencies responsible for trade and industrial policy, a complex 
mix of liberalization and interventionism could be implemented. su-
harto also grasped early on that he could rely on profitable state-owned 
firms—particularly the oil firm Permina (which became Pertamina in 
1968)—to provide an unscrutinized, off-budget source of revenue that 
could be cordoned off from the control of the ui economists and used 
to build political support.
 sufficiently pruned, the ui economists’ plan clearly fit with suharto’s 
perceived need to foster macroeconomic stability and development, 
establish credibility with external actors, and secure state resources to 
distribute to his political supporters. while the ui economists never in-
tended for their arguments to be pruned in such a manner, they quickly 
realized that to find common ground with suharto and their oppo-
nents, some elements of their blueprint would have to put on hold, at 
least until a new opportunity presented itself. this meant that the ui 
economists often saw any liberalization, regardless of its sequence, as 
better than no liberalization at all.62
it also explains why their influence was often confined to a narrow 
subset of issues—the capital account and the financial sector for example 
—such confinement enabled suharto and the nationalists to insulate 
the real economy from market reforms. Market reforms that threatened 
the use of state resources for industrial policy and patronage purposes 
had insufficient crossover appeal to be selected. when backed by the 
ui economists, these market reforms may have had quality carriers and 
cohesion, but without crossover appeal or the perceived need for cred-
ibility, they were unlikely to be implemented.
the pruning of their arguments and their lack of an independent po-
litical base did not mean the ui economists were powerless without the 
support of external actors. on the contrary, in addition to the influence 
they garnered from their expertise and cohesion, the ui economists also 
proved capable of strategically framing and grafting their arguments so 
that they better fit with suharto’s belief system. while sharing the na-
60 on pruning, see acharya 2004.
61 robison 1988; Liddle 1991.
62 Pincus and ramli 1998.
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tionalist, collectivist, and statist beliefs of most indonesians, suharto’s 
belief system was also informed by the specter, and later the memory, of 
hyperinflation and economic deterioration in the 1960s, an experience 
that he was convinced had to be avoided in the future at all costs.63
in advocating their ideas, the ui economists understood, as wil-
liam Liddle suggests, “how to package their explanations and propos-
als within a nationalist, populist, collectivist, and even anti-imperialist 
rhetorical wrapper, associating themselves with the mainstream goals of 
modern indonesian culture.”64 rejecting sukarno’s statism and “free fight 
[unfettered] capitalism,” the ui economists offered their blueprint as 
helping to create a “Pancasila economy,” that is, an economy based on the 
principles enshrined in the country’s constitution, especially nationalism 
and social justice.65 these discursive strategies helped the ui economists 
present themselves not as western stooges seeking to displace wide-
spread beliefs, but rather as upholders of indigenous beliefs who sought 
to strengthen them without undermining them significantly. this strat-
egy helped further strengthen their clout as carriers of new ideas.
over the years, the ui economists also routinely exploited suhar-
to’s fear of hyperinflation and economic deterioration as well as their 
own success and strong track record in staving off indonesia’s collapse. 
“they were,” as one official close to suharto observes, “very good at 
scaring the old man [suharto]. they kept him on a razor’s edge, and 
that’s how they got their way. they told him that if he didn’t follow 
their suggestions the people would be without food or clothes, or the 
economy wouldn’t grow.”66 with their clout and authority effectively 
enhanced by their success in the late 1960s, the ui economists helped 
ensure suharto would call upon them again in times of economic dis-
tress. in addition, widjojo’s deferential communicative style, which 
suharto preferred in his advisors, was also important. on a number of 
crucial issues over the years, widjojo employed a combination of Java-
nese manners and an ability to present complex issues clearly in order 
to bring suharto around to his point of view.67
stabilizing and liberalizing indonesia
the arguments of the ui economists informed how the reform process 
unfolded. in october 1966 an orthodox stabilization program designed 
with imf assistance was put in place. the program imposed a drastic 
63 elson 2001; Liddle 1991, 409–10; woo, glassburner, and nasution 1994, 36, 38.
64 Liddle 1991, 408.
65 salim 1997 [1966].
66 as cited in ford foundation 2003, 51.
67 Liddle 1991, 408–409.
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reduction in the fiscal deficit and significant restraints on central bank 
credit creation. the ui economists also secured passage of additional 
measures such as a balanced-budget law, a limit on deficit financing, 
and greater operational autonomy for the central bank, that were aimed 
at limiting what they diagnosed as the key causes of hyperinflation. 
these measures also fit with their arguments for insulating monetary 
and fiscal policy-making from political interference.
Politically, the stabilization program was a huge gamble, as its ad-
verse effects threatened to undermine suharto’s efforts to consolidate 
his rule. But the gamble paid off. inflation decelerated from an annual 
rate of over 600 percent in 1966, to about 150 percent in 1967, to only 
4 percent in 1971.68
although in principle the ui economists wanted to create a free 
foreign-exchange market, they recognized that in practice indonesia’s 
significant debt burden and shortage of foreign reserves made complete 
freedom unsustainable in the short run.69 still, in october 1966, the 
government took important first steps in liberalizing foreign-exchange 
markets. Later, in May 1967, the creation of foreign-exchange bourses 
marked a major departure from sukarnoist policies, since it was pos-
sible, for the first time, to trade foreign currencies against the rupiah 
freely and legally.
with debt rescheduling and significant new financing extended in 
December 1966, official creditors sent clear signals that they supported 
these actions. although orthodox stabilization adversely affected the 
army, pribumi firms, and the mass public, the success of the ui econo-
mists in taming inflation, managing the debt burden, and unlocking 
external resources bolstered their position against their opponents. the 
enhanced clout provided the ui economists with valuable assets as they 
pushed through additional reforms.
in 1967 restrictions on inward fdi were radically liberalized, including 
greater freedom to remit profits and dividends and to repatriate capi-
tal. salim outlined the radical nature of the law: “at this stage all sorts 
of investments are welcome, except in the excluded defense industries. 
the important thing is not in what sector private investment comes but 
rather when it comes. the time dimension is more important than all 
others.”70 new banking laws that overturned some of sukarno’s interven-
tionism were also introduced. restrictions were eased on foreign bank 
entry, though state banks continued to dominate the financial system.
68 Cole and slade 1996, 16–18.
69 Prawiro 1998, 48.
70 as cited in winters 1996, 64–65.
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Measures were also taken to attract foreign and domestic savings 
into the banking system. residents and nonresidents were permitted 
to attain loans or open accounts denominated in dollars and to convert 
them into rupiah.71 in september 1968 the government implemented 
a significant increase in deposit interest rates offered by state banks.72 
these measures attracted large capital inflows into the banking system, 
which subsequently generated new concerns about excess liquidity and 
renewed inflationary pressures. ironically, after years of facing a persis-
tent shortage of capital, indonesia now found itself facing a “capital in-
flows problem.”73 in response, the government temporarily suspended 
the ability of banks to accept new deposits and over the next three years 
significantly lowered the rate on deposits.
 Despite these measures, important selective restrictions remained. 
some, such as the requirement that state banks and firms secure gov-
ernment approval to borrow abroad, reflected the ui economists’ diag-
nosis that had raised concerns about debt-service obligations. other 
restrictions, such as constraints on the operations of foreign banks and 
the provision of only a limited guarantee of nonnationalization to for-
eign investors, reflected suharto’s efforts to prune the ui economists’ 
blueprint and ensure sufficient crossover appeal while maintaining suf-
ficient credibility with external actors. Market reform and liberalization 
enabled suharto to establish a sufficient amount of external credibility 
while selective interventionism enabled him to use the financial system 
for industrial policy and patronage purposes and to appeal to popular 
hostility toward foreign capital.74
 notwithstanding these restrictions, the economy was clearly moving 
toward greater openness. Liberalization in early new order indonesia 
culminated with the 1970 decision to abolish restrictions on capital 
outflows. the most prominent materialist explanation for this decision 
offers a crisis-induced model of policy change. Liberalization during 
the crisis, in this view, was necessary to attract capital, particularly fdi, 
and to send a positive signal to liquid-asset holders, particularly Chi-
nese businessmen, that they could keep their assets onshore, safe in the 
knowledge that they were free to liquidate their investments.75
But those arguments are not fully convincing. there is little doubt 
that part of the initial impetus for liberalizing restrictions on fdi came 
from the perceived need to respond to official and market sentiment. 
71 arndt and suwidjana 1982.
72 Cole and slade 1996, 17.
73 on the capital inflows problems, see Calvo, Liederman, and reinhart 1994.
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there is little evidence, however, to support the claim that the crisis 
alone was responsible for the radical opening to fdi. More significantly, 
as discussed above, the decision to seek out financing from external 
sources was not automatic; on the contrary, it resulted from the ef-
forts of the ui economists and western creditors to convince suharto 
that their diagnosis and blueprint were the only way out. in fact, even 
proponents of crisis-induced models of policy change make ad hoc 
concessions that stress such social processes. as stephan Haggard and 
sylvia Maxfield claim, “the proximate causal mechanism is politicians’ 
perception that liberalization of the capital account will assure investors 
and thus ultimately induce capital inflows.” such perceptions do not 
float freely. in fact, at the time the decision was made the conventional 
wisdom was that governments should tighten capital controls during 
a crisis. that an alternative perception was inserted into the policy-
making process was largely due to the mechanisms identified in the 
theory developed here.
indeed, it is doubtful that radical liberalization of fdi was the only 
way out. indonesia could have pursued an alternative development 
model such as one that relied on a selective opening to foreign capi-
tal, which arguably could have produced similar results. in fact, despite 
the radical opening, fdi never loomed large as a proportion of gross 
domestic product or gross capital formation.76 nevertheless, the gov-
ernment perceived radical liberalization as necessary. it should also be 
noted that while the fdi law grew out of a perceived need to attract 
foreign capital, its precise form was not simply a response to the official 
and market sentiment. it also reflected the ui economists’ arguments 
against a selective opening, which they viewed as depressing growth 
and stifling the catalytic effect on domestic firms.77
in addition, there is not sufficient support for the claim that controls 
on outflows were abolished solely to attract capital. although part of 
the initial impetus for liberalization in the late 1960s came from a per-
ceived need to attract capital, by the 1970s the economy was no longer 
in dire straits. stabilization had given way to recovery while improved 
export performance and strong capital inflows into the banking system 
enabled the government to replenish its foreign reserves.78 it is there-
fore doubtful that the decision to abolish controls on outflows origi-
nated from some material need to attract capital to an economy that 
was already showing signs of a capital inflows problem.
76 Hill 2000, 77–79.
77 Palmer 1978, 18.
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there is also much evidence undermining the claim that liberaliza-
tion was simply an exercise in signalling. if the government was seek-
ing to send unambiguously positive signals to owners of capital, it was 
not doing a particular good job. in 1968 and 1970, the government, 
due to strong objections from pribumi firms, refined the 1967 radi-
cal liberalization of fdi by excluding additional sectors from foreign 
participation.79 in addition to these measures, the limited guarantee 
of nonnationalization also caused discomfort among foreign owners of 
capital.80 regarding the decision to abolish controls on outflows, with-
out accompanying institutional reforms such as delegating authority 
for capital account policy to an independent central bank, it is unlikely 
the decision would have been interpreted by foreign or domestic own-
ers of capital as a strong signal because liberalization could be easily 
reversed in the future.
there is, however, stronger support for the claim that the decision to 
abolish controls on outflows grew out of a perceived need to maintain 
the confidence of liquid-asset holders, particularly Chinese business-
men. indeed, it is often said that this policy was part of an implicit 
contract between suharto and the military on the one hand, and their 
political supporters among Chinese businessmen on the other. while 
liberalization clearly fits with the interest of Chinese businessmen in 
hedging against their political vulnerability, if capital controls were an 
ineffective policy instrument, then there is a risk in overstating the in-
tensity of this interest.
indeed, some scholars who claim liberalization was part of an im-
plicit contract between suhuarto and Chinese businessmen also argue 
that controls on outflows were abolished because they were ineffec-
tive.81 this presents an inconsistency. one can explain the decision as 
an effort to appeal to the interests of Chinese businessmen in hedg-
ing their political vulnerability. or one can attribute it to the fact that 
the controls were easily evaded. But it is inconsistent to claim that the 
controls were liberalized because they prevented Chinese businessmen 
from liquidating their assets and because they were ineffective.
this is not to deny that the idea to abolish controls on outflows 
was bolstered by its appeal to liquid-asset holders and other owners 
of capital. even if controls could be easily evaded, liquid-asset hold-
ers might have seen liberalization as part of an implicit contract with 
79 robison 1986, 146.
80 winters 1996, 65–66, 70–71.
81 see, for instance, Macintyre 1993, 140, who identifies “dual motives involved in the move” to 
capital account openness.
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the regime that it took their interests seriously. in fact, as the theory 
developed here claims, ideas often win out because they serve as im-
portant coalition-building resources. Yet the above discussion suggests 
that liquid-asset holders may not have been held a very intense interest 
in liberalization.
there is also much evidence to support the view that much of the 
impetus for abolishing the controls came from the ui economists. while 
many scholars allude to the role of the ui economists, few devote seri-
ous attention to how their arguments and strategic actions helped to 
overcome resistance to it. the ui economists viewed abolishing controls 
as consistent with their belief in free markets and as a continuation of 
earlier steps taken to liberalize the foreign-exchange market. More sig-
nificantly, they believed that liberalization would constrain the ability 
of politicians to make inflationary monetary and fiscal policy choices. 
However, nationalists and their business allies strongly opposed this 
position because it would deprive them of their preferential access to 
foreign exchange.82 Bureaucrats within the foreign exchange transac-
tion Board (fetb) also were opposed, as it stood to eliminate one of 
their major activities.
 as part of the 1970 policy decision, the exchange rate was unified 
with support from the imf. Prawiro had favored exchange rate unifica-
tion but concerns about the degree of discipline that capital account 
openness would impose on a fixed exchange rate regime led him to 
recommend a flexible rate that could be adjusted to changing market 
conditions.83 But other ui economists argued for a fixed rate on the ba-
sis that it would stir exports and act as constraint on inflationary policy 
choices.84
 on the issue of abolishing controls on outflows, the ui economists 
were in complete agreement. Controls, in their view, imposed signifi-
cant administrative costs, created severe distortions, and bred corrup-
tion.85 the ui economists also pointed to the failure of sukarnoist con-
trols to prevent capital flight as a clear demonstration of the difficulties 
of effectively controlling capital.86
 wardhana and widjojo first worked to forge an internal compro-
mise among the ui economists on the exchange rate regime and sought 
a way to mute some opposition to liberalization. in discussions among 
the ui economists, Prawiro, in seeking to lessen opposition from fetb 
82 Cole and slade 1996, 330; salim 1997 72.
83 Prawiro 1998, 310, fn. 5.
84 Cole and slade 1996, 44–45.
85 salim 1997, 72; Djojohadikusumo 1986, 38–39.
86 Hill 2000, 42, 66; Prawiro 1998, 290–91.
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bureaucrats, suggested abolishing the bureaucracy and transferring the 
employees to the central bank at commensurate rank and salary and 
more favorable long-term prospects.87 wardhana and widjojo backed 
this proposal while securing support for a fixed exchange rate regime. 
widjojo and salim then went to suharto to convince him of the need 
to liberalize. their arguments proved more influential than those of 
their opponents. suharto, in a cabinet meeting, supported the proposal 
of the ui economists despite hearing many objections.
 the decision was never reversed. notwithstanding its potential ap-
peal to liquid-asset holders, it is remarkable that the ui economists were 
able to implement this policy given their lack of an independent politi-
cal base, opposition from nationalists, and popular hostility. Moreover, 
external actors such as the imf, though supporting exchange rate uni-
fication, did not add much support. in addition, economic conditions 
at the time provided little urgent need to liberalize further to appease 
market (or official) sentiment.
 However, the quality of the ui economists as ideational carriers 
proved to be an asset. Having achieved earlier success, they were in a 
stronger position to push for further reforms. equally important were 
the strategic actions they took to mute opposition and win over su-
harto. in addition to Prawiro’s proposal to transfer fetb bureaucrats to 
the central bank, another important discursive strategy the ui econo-
mists employed was to focus on the corruption associated with capital 
controls.
 By 1970, popular sentiment had begun to turn against elements of 
the new order due to allegations of increasing authoritarianism, cor-
ruption, and government excesses, such as Pertamina’s growing off-
budget borrowing and distribution of funds.88 Pertamina’s activities 
also alarmed the ui economists, who thought the economy was still 
too weak to service nonconcessional debt. Because large debt-service 
payments would place a strain on foreign reserves, the ui economists 
believed that Pertamina’s activities could jeopardize their commitment 
to capital account openness.89
 suharto had shrewdly positioned himself so as to not be implicated 
in Pertamina’s activities, yet he had full knowledge of and benefitted 
from them all the while. nonetheless, he proved sensitive to allega-
tions of corruption, and in 1970 authorized a sweeping investigation of 
practices within the new order, including those of Pertamina. though 
87 Cole and slade 1996, 349, fn. 44.
88 robison 1986, 160, 235.
89 winters 1996, 88.
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suharto permitted Pertamina’s activities to continue until its near de-
fault in 1975, the decision to authorize the investigation represented 
a partial victory for the ui economists. it suggests that the economists 
were able to alert suharto to the fact that whatever benefits he was 
garnering from Pertamina’s activities, he was simultaneously jeopardiz-
ing economic and political stability by undermining the confidence of 
external actors in government policies and in the ability of the ui econ-
omists to direct them. By linking capital controls to corruption, the 
ui economists helped ensure their arguments for liberalization would 
resonate with suharto’s concerns about limiting, or at least appearing 
to limit, corruption.
 the ui economists also strategically kept suharto and the national-
ists in the dark about the policy implications of maintaining an open 
capital account and a fixed exchange rate. By 1970 popular sentiment 
had turned against fiscal and monetary restraint and there was a strong 
possibility that future easing would be necessary to accommodate po-
litical demands. Yet capital account openness, along with the balanced-
budget law, offered ways to constrain these demands.
 the ui economists recognized the extraordinary discipline that 
openness would impose on fiscal and monetary policy. But they chose 
not to share this knowledge with suharto or opponents who lacked 
their sophisticated understanding of open-economy macroeconomics. 
indeed, most government officials did not fully appreciate the mag-
nitude of the decision at the time.90 thus, by strategically shrouding 
their opponents in a veil of ignorance, the ui economists helped win 
acceptance of outflow liberalization.
conclusion
this article shows the limitations of rationalist depictions of crises. in 
indonesia, the new order’s embrace of market reforms was not auto-
matic and newly dominant political coalitions did not play a decisive 
role at each stage of the process. the indonesian case shows that oep 
models, despite their elegance, are often too sparse and too far removed 
from specific national circumstances to provide a useful guide to un-
derstanding crisis politics. Moreover, distributive preferences were not 
a prominent guide to action at all stages of the crisis resolution process. 
even when distributive preferences did assert themselves, such as in 
the debate over the october 1966 stabilization program, key support-
90 Cole and slade 1996, 43, 329–30; Hill 2000, 42, 66; Macintyre 1993, 140; Prawiro 1998, 291.
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ers of suharto often found themselves on the losing side of the argu-
ment. this is not to deny the impact of distributive preferences. in-
deed, the crossover appeal, in both a distributive and ideational sense, 
was argued and found to be important. Yet much oep work on crises 
overestimates the importance of bargaining and negotiation as mecha-
nisms of change while giving insufficient attention to uncertainty and 
the intensity to which distributive preferences are held. in underesti-
mating the role of persuasion, oep work also obscures the influence 
of intersubjective beliefs on actors’ interpretations of material events 
and incentives.
Constructivists, while stressing the role of belief systems, uncertainty, 
and persuasion, do not adequately theorize the scope conditions under 
which a new idea is likely to be selected. this article seeks to rectify 
this shortcoming by identifying the four Cs of crisis resolution: carriers, 
composition, crossover appeal, and credibility. it also strengthens extant 
constructivist work on resonance by considering a broader range of ac-
tors that shape intersubjective change and by developing a more agent-
centered and strategic approach. overall, the indonesian case supports 
the contention that whenever a prominent and cohesive group of carri-
ers advocates arguments with sufficient crossover appeal and externally 
sanctioned credibility, intersubjective change is more likely.
How can these arguments be extended? a research agenda that 
opens up the black box of the crisis resolution process could prove a 
useful starting point. an obvious first place to turn is the global finan-
cial crisis of 2007–09. Despite efforts to coordinate policies, this highly 
visible and intense crisis has nonetheless produced interesting policy 
divergence. this divergence provides researchers with a rich area for 
future empirical inquiry.
in pursuing this research agenda it is worth considering how well the 
arguments developed here apply to other issue areas and institutional 
settings. for instance, it could be the case that political mobilization 
was muted in the indonesian case because capital account liberaliza-
tion is a relatively technical area where the costs for the mass public 
are widely distributed, uncertain, and (when they appear) often very 
delayed. in such issue areas it may prove easier for norm entrepreneurs 
to obtain insulation from the mass public than in those areas where 
the costs are concentrated, clear, and immediate (i.e., fiscal subsidies 
for food or oil). it may also be the case that policy choices in relatively 
technical areas are more likely to depend on credibility with external 
actors than legitimacy with domestic ones. notwithstanding these con-
siderations, it should be noted that in the case of indonesia, the mass 
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public and members of the elite did have relatively clear and intense 
preferences about openness to foreign capital even if they did not fully 
grasp its implications.
in terms of institutional settings, it is worth considering whether the 
perceived need to establish credibility with external actors rather than 
legitimacy with domestic elites and the mass public is particularly in-
tense in authoritarian settings. while the indonesian case reveals that 
mass public demands can shape policy even in an authoritarian setting, 
democracy can often be at odds with market reform. it is therefore 
important to investigate whether the crisis-resolution process specified 
here also pertains to democratic institutional settings.
there are also strong links between the arguments made here and 
other ongoing debates. first, understanding the role of credibility in 
crisis resolution may provide additional insights into how legitimacy 
gaps open up for external actors, such as the imf, and potentially un-
dermine their efficiency.91 in addition, understanding the role of reso-
nance between the beliefs of domestic norm entrepreneurs and those 
of powerful external actors may provide insight into how the attributes 
of countries where international organizations operate influence their 
behavior, including their willingness to support countries where sym-
pathetic interlocutors are present.92
 finally, a broader implication of the focus on credibility is that 
scholars need to be more attentive to the beliefs shared by external 
actors. it is insufficient for credibility-based explanations to simply as-
sume that external actors share particular beliefs. Because the beliefs of 
these actors affect the type of incentives they exert for action, we need 
to be more sensitive to these beliefs to strengthen our explanations. 
this calls for a research agenda that explores more deeply the beliefs 
of official creditors, international organizations, financial-market par-
ticipants, and regulatory and standard-setting bodies. research into 
the common knowledge that informs the behavior of these actors and 
those that interact with them offers a genuine opportunity for synthe-
sis between rationalism and constructivism.93
91 seabrooke 2007.
92 woods 2006.
93 Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998.
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